

# ANNEX

## SECURITY AND DEFENCE DOCTRINE

Analysis  
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# **1. Basic Principles of European Security Policy**

*"Security isn't everything, but everything is nothing without security".*

Providing security in all its dimensions is a basic pre-requisite for a functioning and stable democracy based on the rule of law, and for economic prosperity of a society at large. Security policy must therefore be afforded priority among the political tasks of any state. Under the prevailing conditions, security policy must be designed and implemented as "comprehensive security policy".

## **1.1. New Paradigms in European Security Policy:**

The changes in world politics after the end of the Cold War have also led to a fundamental change in European security policy. The strategic situation as it exists today provides room for new opportunities on the one hand, and risks on the other. The general framework of European security policy is marked by the following developments:

- The bi-polar order, based on a relatively constant, hence controllable, configuration of power and threat, was replaced by a new and unclear reality in global politics accompanied by new security challenges. It is completely different from the situation prevailing over the past fifty years.
- Most noteworthy among the positive changes is the consolidation of freedom and democracy as it now prevails in Europe, and which was brought about by the collapse of Communism. This new security order is still in the making and should be based on the principles of co-operation and solidarity among states, adhering to common principles and values. The broad new opportunities available for political, economic, and military co-operation, are mainly adopted by states working together in the EU, NATO, and OSCE.
- Global politics as they have evolved over the past ten years have, however, also produced a new instability. Although the danger of a major, possibly nuclear, war no longer exists, many new security threats and risks have evolved which are reflected in many small and medium-scale conflicts. As many new governmental and non-governmental actors have emerged outside the traditional political order and follow their own political interests, developments seem incalculable and difficult to control. This makes it extremely difficult to foresee new conflicts.
- While existing, latent or developing conflicts can no longer be controlled along the lines of a bipolar conflict constellation, they develop a dynamic momentum of their own. Conflicts are more likely to escalate today than ever before.
- While security policy at Cold War times mainly focused on the management of external threats, there is a closer connection today between internal and external security problems.
- The classic assignment of certain threats to certain areas of politics (e.g. external threats to foreign politics and defence, internal threats to domestic affairs) is largely obsolete in view of comprehensive security problems.

- Apart from guaranteeing security for the state and its population as a whole, a comprehensive security concept has increasingly come to include security for the individual as well as protection of human rights and basic freedoms.
- While the military dimension of security policy predominated during the Cold War, other, sometimes new, areas likely to pose security risks are gaining in importance. Apart from defence, these include foreign affairs and domestic affairs, economic policy, education, information and communication, and the environment. The significance of each individual aspect may be subject to swift change given the dynamic development and the mutual interdependence of these areas.
- A modern security policy is not primarily a response to threats but to the question of how Europe can and must be shaped so as to avoid threats before they even surface. It is based on the shaping of an environment conducive to such thinking, on prevention of the emergence of risks and threats, and on a common effort to reduce the vulnerabilities of partners.
- So far, counteracting external threats has mainly taken the form of traditional defence. Based on new inter-dependencies and trans-national interactions of threat and risk, and due to the principle of European solidarity, which is becoming increasingly important, even smaller states are well advised to pay attention to and engage in relevant security developments way beyond their own borders.
- In an increasingly globalised world, "national security" depends largely on the regional framework of stability, and "regional security" is influenced by "global security". Trans-national risks and dependencies, new technological developments and the increasing vulnerabilities of modern societies prevent the co-existence of zones of stability and instability without mutual interference. Inevitably, instability will spill over to stable regions. Even in the past the geographical distance from centres of conflict has, in many respects, not provided sufficient protection - a fact which has been described by CSCE/OSCE as the "indivisibility of security", i.e. that security of individual regions cannot be provided at the expense of others.
- Instruments of political action available and necessary for counteracting security threats have increased and have been developed. These days they include a large number of instruments for co-operation and action in the political, military, economic, social, educational, cultural and ecological arenas, as well as information and communication, which require adequate and co-ordinated strategies in those sectors which complement each other.
- All these changes call for a complete re-orientation of security policy as present challenges require more than the simple adjustment of old security concepts to the new situation.

## **1.2. The Concepts of "Security" and "Security Policy"**

Understanding the new paradigms in security policy serves as a basis for a modern concept of security and for the formulation of a security policy.

Security is a state of relative invulnerability<sup>1</sup>. Unless existing already or attainable, measures and actions are needed to safeguard security, to prevent the emergence

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<sup>1</sup> As opposed to a "subjective" sense of security and threat.

or existence of external<sup>2</sup> and internal<sup>3</sup> threats, and, if necessary, to minimise their negative impact. In the best case, security is provided by measures of precaution alone.

The general purpose of security policy is to assure maximum security for all aspects of a community.

Security policy under the present doctrine comprises all measures and means to maintain the security interests of a state. It is particularly assured by the provision of external stability and the prevention of the emergence of external threats to the population and its fundamental values, and, if necessary, by its protection from external threats.

The aim of modern security policy is therefore to provide and maintain optimal political, economic, social, and ecological stability, with particular emphasis on the immediate environment. In this respect, a security policy focused on stability and peace has to be comprehensive, requiring a combination of all non-military and military aspects. Its concept and practical implementation must include all relevant areas of politics in a national and international context; it must provide for a co-ordinated, concerted effort among all national actors serving national security.

### **1.3. Fundamental Strategies of National Security Policy**

A comprehensive security concept leads to a variety of security tasks and choices.

Essentially, the four fundamental strategies are:

- Promoting peace and stability

This fundamental security strategy aims at creating the necessary framework to reduce the likelihood of conflicts to evolve. This strategy includes, among others, measures of political, economic, cultural and military co-operation, for the furtherance of, for example, the protection of human rights, the rule of law and democracy, of prosperity, social balance, and to avoid environmental dangers.

- Providing peace and stability

Provision of peace and stability covers a broad spectrum of security acts aimed at preventing armed conflict - from conflict prevention and crisis management to direct stabilising measures.

- Re-establishing peace and stability

This fundamental strategy refers to the international use of force against a peace-breaker to re-establish peace or terminate serious actions in contravention of international law.

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<sup>2</sup> "External security" denotes a state of being relatively unaffected by danger and risk in the international context; it includes comprehensive precautionary measures to ward off such danger and the ability to react adequately in case of such threat.

<sup>3</sup> "Internal security" results from a policy of prevention or avoidance of danger and threat acting on a society and its institutions "from inside" which restricts its ability to act and function, its internal matters, as well as people's democratic freedoms and the security of the individual.

- Individual and collective self-defence

This fundamental strategy addresses all measures taken by an individual state, a group of states or an alliance to defend against an attack upon their territories, or the safeguarding of the state's inviolability in cases of armed conflict in its neighbourhood.

In the present situation, states and groups of states wishing to assume responsibility for their own peace and security have to be capable of effective defence against an attack, threat or attempted blackmail. The ability to deploy military forces is therefore a pre-condition for an effective policy to maintain peace. It follows that the safeguarding of sufficient protection and defence capabilities remains an essential condition for the stabilisation of peace in Europe.

The strategies of promotion, safeguarding and re-establishment of peace and stability must primarily be attributed to international security policy, while the strategy of self-defence is the core of traditional national security policy. The actions assigned to peace promotion and self-defence are permanent political tasks, while measures to safeguard peace and stability must be taken in each individual case. Measures to re-establish peace or to counter an immediate attack are only taken upon failure of all other peace strategies.

The successful implementation of fundamental security strategies requires multi-national action based on solidarity, as well as involvement of international organisations.

These strategies are not necessarily implemented in the same order of priority as outlined above. It is only upon detailed assessment of a security situation that a decision can be made on the adequacy of any given strategy. While co-operative and confrontational elements of security policy have so far been considered incompatible, a combination of all necessary actions in the form of a "mixed strategy" may be necessary to manage the current security threats. The basic tenet certainly is: "As much co-operative peace promotion as possible and as few measures of force as necessary". The use of military force thus remains a means of last resort for a modern security policy committed to a comprehensive concept of security and application of the rule of law.

#### **1.4. Reformulation of the relationship between national and European security policies**

A reformulation of the relationship between national and European security policies becomes necessary not only as a result of EU membership, but also in the face of existing threats, of an increasing interdependence among European security interests, and increased chances for success of multinational action in implementing security strategies.

Nowadays, the security position of any European state can no longer be seen in isolation given that instability and dangers facing Europe or states in its vicinity go beyond the immediate regional dimension, the security of all states. Though not constituting any immediate existential threat to any single state, the new security challenges and risks can not, on the other hand, be handled by any individual state alone.

Freedom and security of states within the European Union and those co-operating with the Union are based, on the one hand, on common social, cultural and political convictions and principles of order and on common interests and views on the desirable stabilisation of their own surroundings on the other hand. Any development that might lead to the re-nationalisation of security policy must be countered by a further consolidation of security integration.

Peace and stability in Europe are mainly provided by the EU, NATO, OSCE, and states co-operating within these institutions. For the foreseeable future it will be extremely important to ensure the functioning of these institutions and contribute accordingly. In other words, national and European security policies are increasingly linked due to common or compatible security interests of states and the pan-European dimension of present security challenges.

Decision-making in the overall political system remains with individual states. Therefore their interests, and their perceptions of interest, have a decisive impact on international relations. Although states define their goals and strategies within the overall international framework, embedded in different legal systems, the states remain the central actors in security matters. By defining their political goals, deciding on their own strategies, and providing civilian and military means of power, it is the states which shape the relationship among each other. But any ultimate decision on security issues remains with their legitimate national and democratic political bodies.

The EU member states are embedded in a common foreign and security policy under which they co-operate in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity so as to act in unison vis-à-vis the outside world and to pursue common goals.

The smaller, the more developed, and the more economically integrated a state is, the more important it is for that state not to become isolated from developments in matters of security policy. It is therefore vital for smaller and medium-sized states to join international security systems and organisations - it is their only way of effectively voicing and implementing their own interests. The only alternatives to such a policy would be an irrational and extremely expensive strategy of isolation or foregoing the actor status by only passively accepting developments. Major powers or states in an insular situation, especially those in considerable distance from other spheres of power, are less dependent on co-operation or integration than smaller states or countries located in the midst of political forces.

## **1.5. Neutrality versus solidarity**

The concept of permanent neutrality in Europe has been eroded not only due to the end of the Cold War but mainly due to increasing political and economic dependencies, to new forms of political co-operation and integration and strengthened supra-national EU structures. Instead of a policy of "deliberate non-commitment", the new situation requires a policy of solidarity.

The concept of solidarity is defined by the adherence to a community of states sharing common principles and values. Being part of such community entails rights and duties for all participants. The principle of solidarity as applied in international security policy is bi-fold: It provides assistance to an individual state by the

international community in a situation of need; on the other hand, it provides assistance to the community by the individual states. The principle of solidarity can therefore be characterised as mutual assistance within a political community. One particular feature of solidarity in security policy is that nobody clearly knows beforehand which state will be affected by the new risks and dangers, or to which degree. A state that provides assistance out of solidarity may only benefit from such assistance indirectly, but acquires a moral and political entitlement to receive such assistance in return. But this does not mean that difficult and dangerous tasks in maintaining peace and stability should be assumed by a few states, while others take on the less dangerous ones.

An exclusive focus on offering "good offices", on "niches in security policy", or on the civilian dimension of security policy is therefore incompatible with the principle of solidarity and a balanced sharing of burden and risk as required in the European context. "Going for a free ride" when it comes to security policy runs counter to a precept of justice in which the individual state draws advantages from the community (economic or security benefits arising from a European peace zone, for example) while failing to contribute adequately in return. The capability and readiness to make a balanced contribution to security within a community based on solidarity, commensurate with the state's political and economic status, are also decisive factors for a state's political dimension in the international political arena.

## **1.6. The security role of armed forces in Europe**

Armed forces are one of the expressions of a comprehensive and active security policy. Even today they serve as a means of safeguarding a state's security interests. But apart from their traditional roles (demonstration of the will to survive and dissuasion/defence) the armed forces have come to assume new tasks such as international peace-keeping missions to promote, to safeguard, and to re-establish peace and stability.

Military forces thus gain a new and larger dimension as essential means of attaining security goals when it comes to co-operation, conflict prevention, and management and work in the follow-up of a crisis.

At present, a common European defence policy is being formulated, and further developments are uncertain. In implementing reforms aimed at increased integration also in defence matters, most European states therefore leave sufficient room for growth in their national defence capabilities - particularly in view of the fact that military threats may crop up faster than military defence capabilities can be built. A country's military defence capability continues to be the basis both for international missions and for domestic assistance operations. Those states which manage to economise in the field of defence through collective defence alliances are in a better position to assign funds for rapid reaction forces than those states - such as permanently neutral states - which are committed to individual and purely national defence arrangements. The importance of states is also determined by the adequacy of their military contribution to a basic European stability within the framework of territorial national defence and within European crisis management.

Modern armed forces thus have three main functions in dealing with comprehensive security challenges:

### 1. Defence function

This function derives from the fundamental security strategy of individual or collective defence and includes the ability to prevent war by dissuasion, to contribute to basic European stability, to counter a direct attack, and to protect a country's borders and vital infrastructure in case of armed conflict outside its own territory.

With the present situation of peace and stability in Europe being safeguarded primarily by NATO's high defence capability, even non-NATO European states have less "exclusive individual responsibility" for defending their own territories.

Vital national defence tasks are either performed jointly with other states within the framework of defence alliances or on a purely national level. Safeguarding defence by adhering to an alliance becomes increasingly important for reasons of effectiveness, economic efficiency, the maintenance of mutual commitment, and in view of the nature of new strategic security risks (such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, introduction of long-range delivery systems, the information war, and international terrorism).

### 2. Stabilising function within a comprehensive and preventive international security policy

The armed forces contribute substantially to an efficient and credible system of crisis management. They are employed as an instrument to cope with the following international security tasks:

#### 2.1 Promoting peace

- by implementing and supporting humanitarian and other peace goals in co-operation with, and supplementary to, other international and non-governmental organisations; this includes the development of common systems for civil and disaster protection.
- by co-operative confidence-building measures among different states' armed forces, such as arms control and verification, adaptation and further development of security doctrines and defence concepts, creation of common institutions for the collection of information and planning, for training and exercises, co-operation in armament, science and research.

2.2 Preserving peace, to stabilise conflict areas, for example where a return to the use of force is to be avoided.

2.3 Peace building, whenever a community of states takes action, in the name of peace and justice, to control, de-escalate, or terminate a conflict.

### 3. Assistance function

Because of their personnel and material capabilities (especially command and control and logistics), armed forces are capable of providing assistance to civilian authorities and organs, particularly in the following areas:



3.1 national and international disaster relief

3.2 maintaining law and order and security at home, especially in assisting the law enforcement agencies in their fight against organised crime, terrorism, proliferation, and border control.

To perform all these tasks, the armed forces must maintain their overall readiness and co-operate with multi-national security organisations such as the EU, NATO, OSCE, and the UN.

## **2. The general security situation**

### **2.1. Global security situation**

The major changes in the global security situation after the Cold War are largely identical with those described under chapter 1.1 concerning the new paradigms in European security policy.

Generally speaking, the present security situation is becoming less calculable. The number of governmental and non-governmental trans-national actors - sometimes of significant weight and impact on different areas of politics in a globalised world - has risen considerably. In addition, new centres of power of regional or technical importance (in the economic, technological and military fields) have evolved. These dynamic developments also produce new mutual dependencies as far as security is concerned. The stability achieved by a balance of power between the super-powers and by nuclear deterrence has been replaced by processes that are increasingly difficult to control by state power.

The major global aspects shaping security policy after the end of the Cold War can be summarised as follows:

- In spite of the unique position of the United States, world politics shows a tendency towards regionalisation and multi-polarisation. The bi-polar world order has been and is increasingly being replaced by new regional collective arrangements of differing structural importance - such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), or the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation agreement (APEC). Multi-polarisation is also apparent with the emergence and rise of new regional powers. After the end of the bi-polar order, these regional powers, committed to a traditional power concept, try to use their potentials (expressed in population, territory, economic power, and armed forces) to enhance their own position to achieve regional leadership - as is the case with India, Nigeria, or Brazil. This affects both the sovereignty of smaller states in the respective regions and the interests of actors outside the regions concerned, and carries conflict potential.
  
- An increasing number of security actors due to:
  - A growing number of states of different size, political importance, economic capacity, military power, etc.,
  - the rising number of international organisations,
  - the rapidly increasing number and importance of transnational social actors (non-governmental organisations/NGO's) mainly engaged in global environmental protection, development assistance, human rights and humanitarian aid,

- the increasing number and importance of transnational actors beyond state control which pursue their own economic, religious or ideological interests, if necessary by use of force.

- Such variety of new, more or less independent actors, and the new constellations arising from the different relationships among them, have caused confusion in this field. After the end of the bi-polar order dating back to the times of East-West confrontation, and with regional security organisations often lacking in stabilising capability, further developments in relationships among the individual actors, and consequently global developments, can no longer be foreseen in the longer term. These factors must be considered in concert with an inadequate non-proliferation regime of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; the number of states equipped with such weapons and the respective delivery systems is on the increase.

- Acceleration of the globalisation process,

especially due to the progressive shaping and intensification of global market processes, the global communications infra-structure, universal ideals and fundamental values, global networks in science and research, global processes of juridification, and the formation of global networks of actors. Globalisation entails emerging networks of new, non-governmental centres of power; less room remains for classic autonomous action by the state, and the focus is shifting to new areas such as strategic information management. Individual states have to adapt to the new situation. It will only be the highly developed states or alliances of states that will be able to meet these challenges. On the whole, the economic aspect in shaping international relations is growing in importance.

- Traditional dimensions and power impact have changed. In the Western industrial states in particular, it is the technological and scientific bases, the industrial and financial impact of economies, these states' ability to implement their own concepts of justice and values, as well as knowledge and information management, which determine the power position of a state.
- Information and communication technology has acquired a dimension of its own in security policy because it links all other security aspects, thus becoming a power factor in its own right and leaving room for many options.

Except for a few isolated areas, the world-wide information and communication network has become a reality. Massive reductions in financial and technological requirements have made access to strategic information possible for all interested users, irrespective of their position of power. This obliges states to use information technology both passively - as a protection from external harm to their own actions - and actively - as a means of power projection - to implement and preserve their own interests.

For small states, the full and unimpaired access to the required information forms a basis for their freedom of action in security matters. These states must be integrated in larger information networks and they must build their own information systems. It is their only chance to acquire key knowledge in line with their strategic interests.

- The major global problems and security challenges are:
  - Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
  - Destabilising build-up of armaments
  - Totalitarian ideologies and fundamentalist religions
  - Political fragmentation coupled with an erosion of the state's capability to act and establish law and order
  - International organised crime
  - Environmental issues
  - demographic development and migration
  - shortage of energy and natural resources
  - nutrition
  
- The enormous development problems faced by less developed countries, whose inhabitants make up the bulk of the world population, carry conflict potential leading to many unpredictable, possibly very intense, manifestations of conflict unless managed properly. Generally speaking, less developed countries grow much faster demographically than economically. Such population development, coupled with increasing lack of natural resources (water, for example), mismanagement and supra-regional environmental degradation, erodes these countries' living bases and may lead to anarchy and regional conflicts between and inside these states. On the other hand, the developed countries face increased pressure due to migration.
  
- Risk potential also results from the fact that all these processes have acquired a new quality and dimension as new resources, modern arms systems in particular, have become available. Altogether new ways of obtaining their goals are put in the hands of not only unpredictable regimes but also non-governmental actors such as terrorist movements, organised crime, sects and, not least, individual perpetrators; their resources range from sophisticated information technology to the proliferation of (even incredibly simple and cheap) weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems, as well as recent developments in genetic engineering, whose impact has yet to be assessed.
  
- The number of armed conflicts has risen dramatically. The direct impact of such conflicts, which are usually domestic in nature and even affect the more stable countries of a region, have been, in particular, forced mass migration and the disruption of international trade. Furthermore, these largely domestic conflicts, funded by their own "civil war economies" in the form of arms trade, drug trafficking and human trade, may cause indirect destabilising effects on neighbouring societies and states. This type of developments leads to growing international acceptance of intervention as a means of re-stabilising regions of conflict even by using military force.

## **2.2. International arms control and disarmament**

Arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are key factors in international security.

Strategic arms control is based on bilateral agreements beginning in the seventies and entered into between the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian

Federation, on the one hand, and the USA on the other. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), which limits the installation of missile defence systems, is considered a cornerstone in strategic stability. It addresses the danger of a renewed arms race if the ABM regime were put in question by any of the two parties to the agreement. Those nuclear states whose ballistic missiles could become ineffective by a defence system could be tempted to saturate it with additional offensive power or bypass it through deception. A national missile defence system (NMD) is justified by the USA by claiming protection against "risk countries". Apart from the fact that the technical feasibility of such a system is questionable at the moment, its installation would fundamentally change the present strategic balance. Theater Missile Defence Systems (TMD), on the other hand, would be compatible with the ABM regime: they could provide protection against smaller and shorter-range missiles.

General interest in the strategic arms reduction talks (START) continues. Though START II has not yet entered into force, guidelines already exist for START III talks aimed at further reduction of US and Russian strategic nuclear war-heads to approximately 2,000 each. The most important multilateral agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Whereas the majority of states forego the use of nuclear weapons, the states in possession of nuclear weapons have basically committed themselves to nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear proliferation is to be limited further by the 1996 treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT). Lacking sufficient ratification, the treaty has not yet become effective. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central task in monitoring the transfer of fissile material. The UN Disarmament Conference (CD) in Geneva is still engaged in preparing negotiations for a treaty to cut off the production of fissile material (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty), which aims at preventing the production of nuclear weapons.

Other major instruments for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

To prevent the further proliferation of sensitive military technologies, the following international control regimes have been established:

- The "Wassenaar Arrangement" for the control of conventional armament exports, and exports of dual-use goods and technology;
- The "Australia Group" for the control of chemical and biological precursor materials;
- The missile technology control regime (MTCR);
- The "Nuclear Suppliers Group" and the Zangg Committee for Nuclear Exports.

The effectiveness of international instruments for nuclear non-proliferation is seriously challenged by regional developments, particularly in North and South Asia and the Middle East.

The convention on banning the use, storage, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines (APM Convention), which Austria has contributed to considerably, is to eliminate a particularly insidious weapon that produces devastating long-term humanitarian effects. Regrettably, many states with large APM inventories have not joined the convention.

Austria is a member of all multilateral disarmament agreements and armament control regimes mentioned above.

The agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe, signed in November 1990 by former NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) states at the Paris summit of CSCE, is a milestone of European security. The agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) eliminated the threatening superiority of the WTO in five main conventional weapon systems. Upon disintegration of the WTO soon thereafter, the existing balance between two European military blocs became obsolete. The accession of three former WTO countries to NATO in May 1999 called for a revision of the CFE treaty by introducing new maximum national limits. Once entered into force, the adapted CFE treaty as signed by 29 states at the Istanbul summit of OSCE makes accession possible for all OSCE states. Austria intends to make use of this option, giving the country a voice in questions of conventional armament control in Europe.

### **2.3. European security**

Within the global situation as described under 2.1, Europe is a region of increasing stability and economic prosperity, except for continuing tensions in the western Balkans and in some other parts of the European continent. Peace and stability in Europe are based, above all, on the co-operation of many European countries in the EU and NATO, and on the combined efforts made by the two organisations. Former attempts at hegemonial rule by individual European powers has, to the most part, been replaced by the idea of integration. In the framework of EU and NATO enlargement, the European area of stability is being expanded by those states gradually meeting the requirements for admission. Therefore, there are three zones of differing stability in Europe: the stable, integrated core states, those that are in the midst of a process of rapprochement to EU and NATO, and finally the countries not yet visibly approaching the EU/NATO core states.

The massive U.S. political and military engagement in Europe has been key to preserving freedom in Western Europe. The U.S. has repeatedly shown its actual leadership in Europe. Continued U.S. commitment will thus be one of the decisive factors in European development.

Another factor in the development of European security is Russia. It will ultimately depend on Russia whether Europe can build security relations with it in the spirit of partnership and co-operation. Permanent stabilisation of Eastern and Southern European crisis regions will continue to draw on Europe's political, economic and military potentials in the foreseeable future.

The development of the European Union itself will, however, be key to the future of Europe. An effective EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will depend on

credible military resources. If the EU continues to be firm on its path of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), which had started out with so many high hopes, and thus acquires a role of independent actor from the security and military points of view as well, it will gradually assume the role and function of a major player in international relations too. Considering their capabilities and resources, it would be easy for Europeans to play a prominent role in international politics - but they have to want it.

On the assumption that the Common European Security and Defence Policy within the EU continues to grow and leads to a common European defence in the long term, that NATO remains the stronghold of the European security order, and that OSCE too will continue to be able to fulfil its specific role in co-operative security policy, Europe is well poised for prosperous and peaceful progress. In any event, the EU must be able and willing to undertake successful crisis and conflict management in Europe and in adjacent areas and specific regions of particular interest. Beyond that, the EU must also maintain high-level trans-Atlantic relations to be able to serve common interests in the global framework.

## **2.4. Security risks, dangers and imponderabilities in Europe**

Europe faces new security challenges whose origins rest on the new paradigms in security policy and the special developments as described in 2.1. The trans-national character and the complexity of possible forms of threat call for a comprehensive and co-operative approach to security matters within a security alliance.

Threats to security are invariably a function of the relationship between threat and vulnerability. Due to global political changes, the relatively clear threat scenario characterised by military dominance has been replaced by an interdependent combination of risks difficult to assess. Their origins may be social, cultural and religious, ecological, or due to information and communication technologies. Furthermore, the vulnerability of modern societies as a whole has increased. There is a need, therefore, for constant monitoring and evaluation, especially of those developments mutually influencing each other, and for the preparation of precise criteria in political decision-making so as to specify at which moment risk turns into a relevant threat requiring swift action in which immediate threat entailing negative results can be countered.

Major security risks to Europe and its vicinity are summarised as follows:

### **1. The military risk**

For the time being, there are no signs of aggressive political intent, at least by European nations. Military threats result from the relationship between existing military capabilities and political intent. Responsible security policy has to bear in mind that political intent may change and that considerable - though at present not offensive or strategically significant - military capabilities exist in and around Europe. Therefore possible military risk continues, though currently rather limited for the Euro-Atlantic area due to the deterrent effect produced by NATO's defensive capability.

In a wider sense, and pending complete military integration, the potential danger of a re-nationalisation of European security policy constitutes a "residual military risk" that cannot be discarded altogether.

## 2. The proliferation risk

Despite the variety of bans agreed, the number of countries possessing weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems is on the increase. It can be assumed that more than twenty-five countries currently possess or develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the required delivery systems. By 2010, almost all of Europe will be within the range of ballistic missiles launched outside Europe.

## 3. The destabilisation risk

A stable security situation can be upset for varying reasons, particularly the destabilising conflicts resulting from democratic deficits, or economic, ethnic, or religious tensions.

In this context, it is worth mentioning that Eastern and South Eastern Europe still has less stable areas (open border conflicts and territorial issues, unresolved questions concerning national minority groups).

## 4. The globalisation risk

Globalisation entails increasing linkage between external and internal security risks, and emergence of non-governmental actors. Disintegrating state authority in some nations and lack of international counter-strategies have increased the importance of cross-border organised crime. All forms of terrorism have acquired a new dimension with new technological means or even weapons of mass destruction at their disposal.

## 5. The civilisation risk

The effects of natural, technological and ecological disasters, and global health hazards and epidemics are not only destructive and lethal, but have a political impact too, leading, in extreme cases, to political and economic destabilisation of entire regions. Such disasters may lead to massive migration.

## **2.5. Development of the conflict scenario**

If the present global and regional security frameworks remain intact, the longer-term development of a military conflict scenario can be resumed as follows:

- World-wide, the possibility of armed conflict and warfare still prevails given the numerous open and disguised potential conflicts and the restricted effectiveness of the UN system of collective defence<sup>4</sup>. All forms of conventional or sub-conventional warfare must be expected.

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<sup>4</sup> According to "Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kriegsursachenforschung" (Working Group on the Investigation of the Causes of War, AKUF) in Hamburg, there were 35 wars and armed conflicts in 1999 world-wide; according to UN statistics, there were more than 50 million refugees and internally displaced persons, 6.2 million of them in Europe.

The "China Institute for International Strategic Studies" (Cheng Feng, Retrospects and Prospects of the International Strategic Situation, in: International Strategic Studies 1/1997, pp. 10ff.) reports for 1991 - for



- From today's point of view, the danger of traditional war can be excluded for Western Europe in the near future. Nevertheless, individual armed conflicts continue to exist on the European scene, with regionally different causes and types of conflict. Even in some parts of Western Europe, political conflicts are being settled by use of violence (terrorist attacks). In unstable European regions, particularly in fringe areas, the danger of armed conflict settlement persists both on the sub-conventional and conventional levels. In particular, if economic and political measures aimed at stabilising the Western Balkans should fail, political conflict will presumably escalate to armed conflict (residual military risk).
- In the medium and long terms, threats might emanate from armed conflict spilling over from regions adjacent to Europe. Threat or actual use of force by governmental or non-governmental actors outside Europe, covering all levels of conflict, might become a central issue to European security.
- The rising number of nuclear powers (plus the possible availability of nuclear weapons in an additional number of states, including those led by incalculable regimes) has shattered the classic logic of deterrence, assuring destruction in case of first use of nuclear weapons. This fact, combined with the proliferation and perfection of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction together with their delivery systems, leads to a potentially higher risk of regional conflicts in which (limited) means of mass destruction are employed.
- At the same time, the threat of sub-conventional conflict increases, be it organised crime, state or privately sponsored terrorism or certain special interest groups (such as the 1993 bombing of the New York World Trade Center, or the toxic gas attack in the Tokyo underground in 1995). The availability of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, and of modern information technology in particular, makes net-based, service-oriented societies more vulnerable, encouraging such groups to use the new options for their own goals. On a trans-national level, these developments require an increasing number of counter-strategies by state alliances.

## 2.6. Trends in armed forces development

Western countries' armed forces continue to undergo a re-structuring process which converts their national or allied defence capabilities in large-scale conventional conflicts into forces for crisis management and intervention. This process may last for another decade.

With some massive cuts in defence budgets (settling down to 2 per cent of GNP<sup>5</sup> on the EU average), funds are increasingly channelled to the development of capabilities for rapid action in adjacent crisis areas. During this process, forces

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China the end of the Cold War with the crumbling of the Soviet Union - a total of 29 regional wars and armed conflicts globally, 7 of which erupting that year; 30 wars and 12 new outbreaks in 1992; 1993: 34 and 13, 1994: 38 and 15, 1995: 46 and 11, and 1996: 29 and 4, respectively, representing a drop for the first time, both in the total and the number of newly erupted wars.

The SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook 1998, using a different methodological approach, lists the following number of major armed conflicts: 1989: 32, 1990: 31, 1991 and 1992: 29 each, 1993: 27, 1995: 25, 1996 and 1997: 24 respectively.

<sup>5</sup> For further reference concerning the percentage of the defence budget in GNP: NATO Europe 1999: 2.3% (1998: 2.2%, 1985: 4.0%), Non-NATO-Europe (without Russia) 1999: 3.6% (1998: 3.3%, 1985: 4.3%).

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000/2001. Austria: 0.8 % (1998: 0.8 %, 1985: 1.2 %).

primarily geared to traditional national defence are being converted into crisis reaction forces. Initiating a process of "Force Structure Review", NATO has responded to current changes in the security framework. The idea is to replace current categories of forces, namely rapid crisis reaction, defence and build-up forces, by the following categories by 2003:

High Readiness Forces (HRF), Lower Level Readiness Forces (LRF), Longer Term Build-Up Forces.

The objective is to make HRF available within 90 days, LRF between 90 and 360 days, and Longer Term Build-up Forces between 360 days and several years. NATO's strategy in this respect is to make all categories of the armed forces available for crisis reaction.

Most Western nations defend their territories in an alliance, thus benefiting considerably from burden-sharing and gaining freedom of action for re-structuring their armed forces and defence systems. In the alliance, there is a general tendency to convert the military into voluntary, i.e. professional armed forces, while countries that are not members of an alliance must perform the whole spectrum of tasks alone, thus still requiring the system of universal conscription. There is, however, a general trend towards professional armed forces in all countries.

The position of the U.S. armed forces is unique: they are traditionally geared to strategic power projection and have spent considerable amounts on the quality of their personnel and material resources since the eighties. In spite of drastic cuts in defence budgets and force strengths in the nineties (though defence spending is slightly on the rise again), continued investments in research and development have given the United States a qualitative technological edge over all other armed forces, which contributes to their dominant position in world power. Among other things, their superiority becomes particularly apparent in "smart" weaponry, sophisticated information and communication technology, strategic transport capabilities and reconnaissance systems, as well as logistics.

These facts also have a significant impact on the development of the European armed forces. European NATO members are attempting to build crisis intervention forces parallel to their traditional territorial defence forces, which are losing in importance.

The EU is resolved to acquire credible military means and capabilities for autonomous crisis management. To conduct difficult operations - the Petersberg missions as outlined in art. 17 (2) of the EU Treaty include combat operations for peace enforcement - the EU will, in the near future, have to resort to NATO's military means and capabilities. A strategic partnership must therefore be built between the EU and NATO based on transparent armed forces planning coherent with NATO requirements. (Compatibility between EU Common European Security and Defence Policy and NATO European Security and Defence Identity).

By 2003, the EU envisages to transfer an intervention force of corps strength (approx. 60,000 soldiers) into a crisis region in a matter of 60 days for minimum deployment of one year. All EU states except Denmark, which has opted out, have agreed to make sufficient national contributions to achieve such headline goal. Other European countries (the non-EU NATO states and EU accession candidates) have committed themselves to providing additional contingents to the force. A monitoring system is to ensure the desired qualitative standard of these extensive national

contributions to EU military crisis management capabilities (training levels, equipment, degree of readiness). Furthermore, the EU wishes to develop collective strategic capabilities in reconnaissance and air transport, as well as command and control.

To ensure NATO-CESDP collaboration without friction, constant consultation and representation in each other's governing bodies are envisaged.

The trends in the development of the armed forces as outlined above are specific to North America and Europe, while the armed forces development process in most other countries continues to be geared to efficient national defence and to exercise of power in the region if and when the need arises. It is worth mentioning here that for reasons of expenditure and expertise, developments leading to the wide-spread use of sophisticated weaponry are slow and isolated attempts. It must be observed, though, that some of these states make a considerable effort to acquire means of non-conventional warfare, which are low-cost if needed in small quantities. These include, above all, information technology, but also weapons of mass destruction and corresponding delivery systems. The mere availability of even a small number of weapons of mass destruction enables these countries to undercut the conventional military superiority of particularly Western states, because even threat of use leads to enormous protective measures. Therefore one must expect that weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems will continue to proliferate.

### **3. The roles of global, trans-Atlantic, and European security institutions**

Security and stability can only be provided by close co-operation among institutions that mutually support and complement each other. These institutions include the United Nations and, in the European and trans-Atlantic contexts, above all the EU, NATO and its offspring, Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and OSCE. All these institutions have comparative advantages and make specific co-operative contributions to security.

#### **3.1. The United Nations**

As an organisation of universal membership, the United Nations Organisation (UNO), founded in 1945, is called upon to maintain international security and to promote peaceful co-existence among states. This is effected by establishing rules and institutions for peaceful settlement of disputes, by establishing and practising a system of collective security, and by taking measures to overcome colonial rule, by promoting mutual understanding, cultural development and socio-economic development, and by reducing the gap between rich and poor countries. In this respect, the UN attempts to assist in the removal of causes leading to international conflict - such as elimination of social injustice and economic disparities - and to ensure the observation of human rights. The UN is meeting the increased challenges by a comprehensive reform process aimed at improving its capability to act in all respects, and especially as far as peace-keeping operations are concerned.

During the Cold War, the UN usually lacked the power to resolve conflicts by ordering coercive measures due to the veto power exercised by permanent members of the Security Council. Under these conditions, peace-keeping became central to the UN security commitment. From 1989, conditions for Security Council action under Chapter VII of the Charter started to improve. Though unable to order coercive measures independently during the second Gulf War, the Security Council empowered a coalition of states under a "lead nation" to use force against the aggressor. Peace-supporting operations in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) have been commissioned to NATO due to the fact that other measures - particularly in the case of UNPROFOR engagement under direct UN command - have proved inadequate.

Since the inception of the UN, individual states and groups of states have repeatedly emphasised their right of individual and collective self-defence under Art. 51 of the Charter due to the fact that the UN system of collective security proved to be of limited general application. WEU and NATO, among others, were founded based on that provision of the Charter.

Increasing globalisation creates a rising need for multi-lateral co-operation in fighting terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking. In drafting global conventions and promoting the exchange of information, the UN makes valuable contributions in this

respect. Furthermore, the UN has established early warning and operational systems for environmental protection, migration, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief.

Experience shows that the UN cannot fully cope with the responsibility conferred upon it as far as peace and international security are concerned. Therefore co-operation of several international organisations has proved to be the most promising option. As all burden-sharing states are also members of the UN, the principles of the UN Charter apply in any case.

### **3.2. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

By setting common standards of conduct among member states, whose adherence can be enforced on a political level, OSCE (the former CSCE), initially from 1975, has contributed to military confidence-building and more civilised East-West relations. At the end of the eighties, OSCE (then CSCE) was involved in bringing about radical political change in Europe on a controlled basis. From the early nineties, OSCE has assumed operational tasks in preventing conflicts, and in the management and follow-up of civilian crises. An effective instrument in this connection is, among others, the OSCE High Commissioner for national minorities. The unique character of OSCE consists in its broad geographical scope (membership includes all states of the Euro-Atlantic Region and all successor states of the former Soviet Union) and its comprehensive security approach (combining military security with democracy, human rights, protection of minorities, cultural co-operation, social and economic development, and environmental protection). As a forum of political consultation, OSCE also serves as an instrument to overcome the lack of confidence and the divisions still existing in Europe.

Requiring unanimity and lacking the necessary power, OSCE cannot take efficient action and preserve peace if violence erupts. Such cases call for UN or NATO action.

### **3.3. The European Union**

The EU is a unique peace project aimed at deepening and expanding European integration. To prevent future wars among each other, six Western European states started integrating their coal and steel industries in 1951 (ECSC), creating an economic community seven years later (EEC, EURATOM). In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union based on three pillars: European Community, ECSC and EURATOM; Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); judicial and police co-operation in criminal matters). The EU is a community committed to the joint preservation of peace and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to democracy based on the rule of law, and to prosperity, defending these principles and stability even beyond EU borders.

At present, twelve countries are negotiating accession to the EU, with perhaps more to come, raising the number of EU member states to approximately thirty in the current decade. Among other aspects, the EU comprises a common market, a monetary union, a number of common policies (ranging from foreign trade to environment), and has introduced EU citizenship. A Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP), which includes a common defence policy, is in the making. Under CFSP, decisions are made on common points of view, joint actions, and joint strategies. The EU not only protects the stability and prosperity of its members but is now also willing to contribute towards the prevention of conflict and crisis management outside its borders.

Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) serves to enhance the effectiveness of CFSP and to enable the EU to engage independently in "humanitarian tasks and search and rescue missions, peace-keeping tasks and combat operations in crisis management including peace-making measures". These so-called Petersberg missions, which were accorded by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992, are instruments of crisis management. At present, collective defence is not among the goals set by CESDP, despite the fact that Article 17(1) of the EU Treaty as amended in Amsterdam points to the perspective of common European defence ("if the European Council so decides"). EU assurances of mutual assistance were discussed in the past but did not meet with all EU countries' approval.

Since the end of 1998, remarkable progress has been made towards a common EU defence policy. Under the impact of the Kosovo crisis, EU governments have noted that credible CFSP and a global political role of the EU are not possible without a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).

In a first step, the EU was given structures for future autonomous crisis management: a political and security committee, a military committee, and a military staff, all of which are intended to permit continuous security consultation and rapid decision-making in case of crises. Within these CESDP structures, the High Commissioner for CFSP, backed by a planning and early warning unit, are afforded a central role. By 2003, the EU should have developed credible military capabilities (approximately sixty thousand soldiers deployable within sixty days for operations of up to one year). Until the EU establishes its own strategic means and capabilities for crisis management, it will have to rely on NATO. The operability of CESDP will heavily depend on harmonious Euro-Atlantic partnership based on co-operation and trust between EU and NATO and on the principles of complementarity and mutual support.

In addition to the military capabilities as mentioned above, the European Council also agreed in Helsinki strengthen the EU's non-military international crisis management capabilities. For this purpose, a committee for civilian crisis management was created to co-ordinate and enhance the effectiveness of the different non-military resources at the disposal of the EU and its members. Current efforts are focused on:

- Creation of a specifically trained, stand-by high-readiness pool of civilian police forces for EU and other international missions (UN, OSCE)
- Strengthening the rule of law, especially by assisting in the re-establishment of the judicial systems and prison service
- Support in re-building civilian administrative structures, and
- Improving existing capabilities for civil protection and defence.

The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam made the WEU an integral part of EU development. The creation of permanent CESDP structures (early 2001) made the WEU obsolete, as reflected in the treaty of Nice; for the time being, only the Treaty and WEU bodies have remained. What also remains is the Western European

Armaments Group (WEAG), the WEU's body dealing with armament issues. The EU states have agreed to strengthen the industrial and technological bases of their defence systems by closer co-operation in the defence industry.

The EU plays an important role in providing non-military security, especially in its fight against organised crime, terrorism and international drug trafficking. The "area of freedom, security and justice" as defined in 1999, is to comprise the following key elements: a common policy on asylum and migration (partnership with the countries of origin), a common European asylum system (control of migratory movements), a European area of justice (improved access to justice, mutual acceptance of judicial decisions, increased convergence in civil law), a common fight against crime (prevention of crime on a EU level, intensified co-operation in fighting crime, special measures against money laundering), and increased co-ordination of foreign policy.

### **3.4. North Atlantic Alliance / Partnership for Peace / Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council**

NATO, founded in 1949, is the only functioning defence alliance in Europe, with 19 members at present. According to today's NATO strategy, its members are obliged to collective defence, crisis management and security co-operation. During the Cold War, NATO served to preserve the military balance in Europe, thus indirectly also protecting Austria's security. Since the early nineties, NATO has gradually adapted to the new European situation. Thus a Western bulwark against the gigantic Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact turned into an organisation committed to security co-operation with its former adversaries and their successor states. Beyond the framework of PfP, special relationships were developed with Russia and Ukraine, accepting these countries' specific strategic roles. At its 1999 Washington spring summit, NATO accepted memberships of three former WTO states (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) and announced possible future enlargement.

NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) now includes forty-six members. The nineteen NATO states and twenty-seven partner countries promote co-operation among their armed forces with the aim of contributing to stability and security in Europe and increasing the inter-operability of the armed forces if and when common engagements arise. PfP was supplemented by a political forum of consultation, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

The partner countries' Planning and Review Process (PARP) for consultation and multi-national armed forces planning is key to the large number of PfP operations including peace-support measures. It forms the basis for increased integration of partner countries in planning and decision-making processes. The experiences made in NATO defence planning serve as a basis for the partnership goals to be achieved within PARP. These goals include multi-national training and exercises for partner states' armed forces - if announced to NATO - as well as peace operations together with NATO forces. As the outlined development process shows, "the new NATO" is not merely a traditional military alliance. Today's NATO is a comprehensive security community based on democratic values which makes significant contributions to peace and security in Europe by virtue of its commitment to stability. New crisis management and comprehensive co-operation tasks complement the traditional commitment to a credible collective defence. By opening up to new members NATO,

like the EU - both of which are increasingly interlinked via CESDP - decisively contributes to the expansion and consolidation of the European peace zone.



## **4. Austrian Security**

Proceeding from the concept of comprehensive security, all aspects of security and their linkages as outlined above are of significant importance in making a specific assessment of security policy in Austria. At present, the Austrian security situation can be considered rather positive, in particular, Austria's internal stability based on the rule of law, democracy and economic prosperity; the country's integration in the EU as a community based on solidarity, and basically good relations with all its neighbours. But as the military dimension is still highly relevant for security, Austria's specific geo-political and strategic military position is summarised as follows:

Like all EU states, Austria is affected, to varying degrees, by the entire spectrum of global and/or European security risks, dangers and imponderabilities as outlined under 2.1 and 2.4 above. Overwhelming military threat has been replaced by a variety of security risks difficult to assess and mutually influencing each other, all requiring comprehensive security measures. Apart from the military situation, the following danger and risk potentials affect Austrian security:

- In spite of existing non-proliferation regimes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may entail new threats also for Austria.
- The increasing development and availability of long-range air assets, especially ballistic and cruise missiles, may lead to military threat to Austria, even from regions outside Europe, in a matter of only a few years.
- Over the past few years, information warfare has gained importance as a potential security risk for all modern information societies. Covering both the civilian and the military spheres, it affects government, trade and industry, and society as a whole. In modern military parlance, it is referred to as the "information war".
- Due to complex and trans-national contexts of threat and risk (as described in Chapter 1), the geographical distance from crisis areas no longer affords adequate protection. Therefore conflicts outside the consolidated Europe may have negative repercussions on Austria too. In particular, mention must be made here of the resulting movements of refugees, disruption of foreign trade, environmental problems, or arms trade, drug trafficking and human trade to finance such conflicts. Such threats can best be countered by stabilising the region through comprehensive political and economic support or international military presence.
- The effects of globalisation have had an increasing negative impact on Austria – through organised crime, for example. Sub-conventional dangers, especially subversive attacks on strategic infra-structure, terrorist attacks or associated attempted blackmail to achieve certain political goals, are increasing in importance together with new capabilities (weapons of mass destruction and information technology in particular). Such threats may emanate both from governmental and non-governmental actors such as terrorist movements, organised crime, sects, or even individual perpetrators. Sub-conventional threats may emerge surprisingly, without warning time.

## **4.1. Austria's geo-political situation**

Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, progressive integration of its former members into European and trans-Atlantic structures, and EU accession, have fundamentally changed Austria's geo-political situation. First, Austria's position changed from a precarious one between the two military blocs into a vulnerable position at the margin of then unstable former Eastern Bloc countries. Positive developments in these countries, and NATO accession by three of these countries in particular, expanded the consolidated European area further to the East. Eastern-Central Europe became a region marked by fast development of its economies and security policies. Austria's position changed from a marginal one into the centre of a co-operating Europe. But Austria's relative vicinity to the Balkans, which still is considered unstable, is also quite relevant for Austria's security. Due to its central geographical position with its important East-West, but also North-South connections (transit routes in particular), Austria continues to be influenced by all developments, challenges, risks, but also opportunities, opening up in this region. But the advantages of this geographical situation are put in a different perspective when considering that Austria is small in area and might therefore be by-passed relatively easily if solidarity should prove to be limited in a particular case. EU and NATO enlargement, and Austria's position during and after these processes, are determinant factors for Austria's geo-political situation. At present, Austria still has EU external borders to Eastern Central and South-East European states, which implies political responsibility for control and protection of these borders. Following NATO accession by Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, Austria, together with Switzerland, forms a neutral area amidst NATO states. Following Slovenia's and Slovakia's possible accession to NATO, Austria will become a geo-political enclave amidst European states integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security community. The next step in EU and NATO enlargement will thus contribute to Austria's external security. In this context, and to benefit from these developments, Austria will be called upon to make further contributions to solidarity such as the country's continued participation in stabilising the Balkan area, upgrading the transport infrastructure, and, if necessary, assistance in EU external border protection.

## **4.2. Austria's military strategic position**

Austria's military strategic position is characterised by the general positive changes in the strategic global political framework, the country's specific situation as a small non-allied state, and the consequences of its EU membership.

Austria's security is highly dependent on global and overall European security developments as well as the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE capability of effective crisis and conflict management and follow-up in Europe and adjacent regions.

Austria's present military strategic position is embedded in the following framework:

- Major conventional or, possibly, even nuclear, military conflict on European soil is not expected for the near future.
- Austria has no political problems with its neighbours which might escalate to military conflict.
- The countries not yet integrated into NATO or EU have no offensive strategic capabilities so far.

- According to strategic military analyses, existence-threatening aggression against Austria by conventional armed forces is not conceivable unless strategic changes occur in the political and military situation, with a warning time of 7 to 10 years.
- Possible conflicts in parts of Eastern or South-Eastern Europe might, however, affect Austrian security.
- Sub-conventional threats may come as a surprise without warning time.

The above is a summary of the current military strategic framework. Since positive military strategic situations may change in the long term, responsible security policy must continue to consider future chances of emerging military threats and risks.

Most important, developments on the international scene have to be followed, analysed, and translated into concrete plans of the country's defence capability. It can be assumed today that the concept of "defensive military capability" does not imply autonomous defence of the entire national territory. What matters rather is to maintain military core functions to a minimum operational degree, thus maintaining the country's scope of action in defence policy and preparing the pre-conditions for adequate military reaction. Today, the growth potential of the Austrian Armed Forces has to be organised, trained and equipped to the extent that military requirements can be met even in ten years' time.

If left alone with its military tasks, Austria's military capability would soon be exhausted, even in cases of potential regional conflicts spilling over to parts of Austrian territory.

All states, whether allied or not, are and will always be called upon to cover a certain operational spectrum on their own. It is relatively narrow, but requires considerable effort especially by smaller states. In view of the military strategic situation, Austria for good reasons undertook to institutionalise solidarity by taking joint preventive measures against risks and dangers. Austria is committed to solidarity as described above especially due to its EU membership. Austria's military contribution to CESDP and its active involvement in PfP have posed new tasks to the Austrian Armed Forces. Apart from continued commitment to individual self-defence based on armed neutrality, the capability of joint participation in the entire spectrum of crisis management tasks is central to current defence considerations.

### **4.3. Development of Austrian defence policy and of the Austrian Armed Forces**

The present structure of the Austrian Armed Forces reflects gradual structural adjustment to the international security situation.

The concept of Comprehensive National Defence as developed from 1961 onwards was embedded in the Constitution in 1975. Under Article 9a of the Austrian Constitution, the role of Comprehensive National Defence is to "maintain [Austria's] independence from external influence as well as the inviolability and unity of its territory, especially to maintain and defend permanent neutrality".

Together with the constitutional amendment, the Austrian Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution in 1975 "on the fundamental formulation of Comprehensive

National Defence in Austria" (defence doctrine). These were the bases of the current national defence plan, which was adopted by the Austrian Government in 1983 and foresaw "protection of the country's population and fundamental values from all threats" as a basic goal of Austrian security policy.

The operational impact of these decisions on defence policy was the development of a "dissuasion strategy" and the concept of "area defence". Implementation of the area defence concept implied a strength of 300,000 after mobilisation, whose principal task was to defend Austrian territory, divided into "key and area security zones". Mainly for budgetary constraints - with Austrian defence spending amounting to an average 1.2 per cent (maximum 1984: 1.34 per cent) share in GDP between 1973 and 1988 - the concept of area defence has never been implemented as planned. Therefore the so-called "Armed Forces Organisation 1987" cut strength after mobilisation down to 186,000 even before the end of the Cold War. This decision basically rounded out the status of implementation of the area defence concept reached at the time. It was justified by the changes in security policy and military strategy that were to set in in Europe two years later. During the 1955 to 1989 period, the Austrian Armed Forces were never called upon to demonstrate their military effectiveness in a case of defence against an attack directed against Austria itself.

Traditional military threat scenarios for Austria dating from Cold War times have disappeared after 1989. But the new security risks should soon become apparent in the armed conflicts evolving on former Yugoslav territory. In July 1991, the Austrian Armed Forces were deployed for border protection. During that operation, the "Goldhaube" air surveillance system and "Draken" interceptors were able to prove their worth.

Following the new strategic military situation and the 1991 operational experience, area defence was replaced by a "flexible operational concept for security operations along the borders and defence" and the total strength was cut to 120,000. This restructuring effort was accompanied by the disbanding of nearly all territorial forces (blocking forces and forces employed in guerrilla tactics). In parallel, structural adjustments were made in the armed forces organisation, increasing mobile forces from eleven to fifteen brigades and making ready forces of approximately 15,000 available, 10,000 of them as standing forces and 5,000 as readily available reserve forces. Again the concept was not implemented completely for budgetary constraints. Necessary investments to enhance the quality of brigades in particular, especially their reconnaissance, mobility, and command and control elements, were not made as required. Anti-tank guided weapons and air defence missiles were only introduced in the late eighties and were nothing but isolated attempts at catching up with technology that had been standard in some other countries' armed forces for decades.

Within the "New Armed Forces Organisation" and its "structural adjustment" process, the second half of the nineties was therefore marked by the most recent structural reform of the armed forces, which again led to a reduction in operational strength and necessary structural adjustments. It resulted, in particular, in a considerable reduction in the number of large units from 15 to currently 5, with the purpose of concentrating active personnel and modern equipment in the remaining units, thus meeting present challenges by optimising operational strength. Minor investments were made to raise

the standard of mechanised combat troops and artillery to international levels and to enable their participation in international operations. No budget was eventually assigned to the air elements, and the urgently needed protection of infantry soldiers with armoured personnel carriers was reduced to a mere declaration of intent.

Prestigious international operations further reduced the already limited defence funds.

In the nineties, the Austrian Armed Forces (AAF) changed from a peace-time army (with a mainly passive, dissuasive character) into a war-time organisation whose priorities have increasingly shifted to international crisis management operations, national and international humanitarian and disaster relief missions, and assisting civilian authorities in border surveillance, thus contributing to security within EU frontiers.

Numerically, this means that approximately 3,500 soldiers are currently deployed at any time (up to 1,400 serving abroad and approximately 2,100 assisting civilian authorities at home).

But not only quantity has changed (from three missions abroad at any time in Cold War times to currently 17 missions). A qualitative change took place from traditional lightly armed UN Blue Helmets (peace-keeping) in the Middle East (Golan heights, Cyprus) in particular, to more robust, heavily armed, NATO-led peace enforcement missions with broader mandates in the Balkans (Bosnia/I(S)FOR, Albania/ALBA and Kosovo/KFOR), which include peace enforcement with military means of force if necessary. The Austrian KFOR infantry battalion in Kosovo has the most far-reaching rules of engagement ever given to an Austrian contingent abroad.

In view of Austria's basic readiness to take part in the development of military EU capabilities for crisis management, necessary measures for participation of the AAF in reaching EU headline goals must be taken. Considerations in this regard have to be guided by the requirements set by the European Council and cover the entire spectrum of the Petersberg missions; these exceed Austrian standards, which have so far mainly included peace-keeping missions.

The concept of "prepared units" as agreed upon by the Austrian Government on May 25, 1993, is thus insufficient to meet present challenges. It referred mainly to the low-intensity conflict potential typical of peace-keeping missions.

On the other hand, EU and NATO/PfP goals require permanent availability of international forces also for higher-intensity conflicts, particularly for peace enforcement missions.

International comparison shows that the AAF are indeed capable, especially as far as training is concerned, of coping with international tasks. They lag behind considerably, however, in equipment and availability of personnel; these aspects require organisational measures and additional budgetary means.

#### **4.4. Institutional Aspects**

#### **4.4.1. Austria as a member of the United Nations**

Austria has at all times attached central importance to the endeavours undertaken by this universal organisation towards maintaining world peace and international security, and Austria has always contributed to the UN system of international security.

Since the mission to Congo in 1960, participation in UN peace-keeping operations has been a central focus of Austrian commitment to the world organisation. Since that year, about 40,000 soldiers of the AAF have taken part in UN or UN-authorized operations. Austria is a member of the stand-by arrangement created by the UN Secretary General to facilitate the planning and implementation of peace-keeping missions. Together with Argentina, Denmark, Finland, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Sweden, Austria is currently taking part in the UN Stand-by Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a multi-national brigade designed to be ready for peace-keeping operations of up to six months within 30 days.

Austria's role in UN peace missions has undergone continuous development in the nineties. Based on experience gained from the Second Gulf War, Austria has come to conclude that obligations arising from the UN Charter have priority over its commitments to neutrality.

From the mid-nineties, Austria has been involved in peace-making operations, though initially without deploying combat troops. These are UN-authorized and carried out under NATO or a lead nation's operational command. With respect to its more than 500-strong force contingent based in Kosovo, Austria in July 2000 withdrew its reservation concerning KFOR rules of engagement, which had excluded its participation in measures of enforcement.

#### **4.4.2. Austria as a member of the OSCE**

Austria plays an equally active role in OSCE as it did with its predecessor, CSCE. During the times of the Cold War, and due to its geographical situation, Austria was particularly interested in East-West reconciliation and co-operation - a role successfully assumed by CSCE until 1989. Since the fall of the communist system, Austria has had a natural interest in stabilising the situation in the Eastern European Continent. The Vienna-based OSCE, which is based on a comprehensive security concept, provides a forum for co-operation among 55 European, North American, and Central Asian countries on an equal footing, thus making indispensable contributions to stability in Europe, and consequently to Austrian security.

OSCE is the institution responsible for conventional armament control in Europe. Apart from a sophisticated set of rules for military confidence and security building measures (Vienna CSBM document) and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE], which has been open for ratification by all OSCE states since it was amended in 1999, OSCE also provides a framework for sub-regional armament control (in compliance with the Dayton Agreement: agreements on CSBMs and armament control for Bosnia-Herzegovina, proposed agreement on stabilising the former Yugoslav region). Like all other OSCE states, Austria is bound by the

provisions of the CSBM document and considers joining the CFE Treaty (setting a ceiling on national limits for five main conventional weapon systems).

Austria approves of the further strengthening of OSCE, particularly as far as early warning, conflict prevention, civilian crisis management, and conflict follow-up are concerned.

#### **4.4.3. Austria as a member of the EU**

One essential reason for Austrian EU accession was the adherence to the European stability zone which it implied. Austrian security and EU security are inseparable. European integration started out as a peace project, hence as a security concept from the very beginning - one of the major reasons for Austria's encouraging the current EU enlargement process. Accession by Austria's neighbours serves to increase security and stability in its immediate vicinity.

When joining the EU, Austria took over the Union's entire legal and political framework (*acquis communautaire*), already comprising the Treaty of Maastricht and its provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article J.4 of the Treaty allows for a possible common defence policy, which might in due course lead to joint defence. When ratifying the Austrian accession treaty, Article 23f was added to the Austrian Constitution, stipulating that the Constitution would not restrict Austrian participation in CFSP because of the law on neutrality. Ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam was accompanied by an amendment to Article 23f of the Constitution in 1998, applying the said CFSP stipulation – particularly with regard to the Petersberg missions - also to the amended Treaty.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which Austria contributed to in its capacity as EU member, sets out the concrete goal of gradual definition of a common defence policy. The Treaty reinforced the institutional links between the EU and the Western European Union (WEU) and incorporated the Petersberg missions for crisis management into the EU Treaty.

At its Helsinki meeting in December 1999, the European Council resolved to equip the EU with credible military capabilities and efficient decision-making structures for future autonomous crisis management operations.

Austria fully supports the dynamic development of CESDP, in evidence of its resolve to jointly participate in all spheres of European security and defence as an equal partner.

Austria will adequately contribute to the EU's military capabilities. By 2003, the Austrian Armed Forces will provide an infantry battalion for peace enforcement, a second infantry battalion for peace-keeping, and smaller special units for CESDP purposes. Austria attaches priority to the participation in CESDP operations over all other international peace missions. A longer-term goal of Austria's involvement should be its contribution of a brigade or brigade equivalent.

Austria supports close co-operation between EU and NATO based on trust. The EU relies on NATO in many respects: for armed forces planning and in preparing

operations, it uses proven NATO planning procedures; under certain conditions, it may resort to military NATO means and capabilities for crisis management. Institutional links exist between the EU and NATO as far as their joint responsibility for European security is concerned. Furthermore, non-EU European NATO states are institutionally linked to CESDP.

When the Helsinki resolutions were prepared, it was Austria that supported stronger EU civilian crisis management capabilities. Austria makes adequate contributions to the targeted 5,000-member EU police force pool.

In connection with CESDP, EU states are aware of the need for increased co-operation among their defence industries. Common European standards and specifications for armaments are to encourage not only competition among European arms industries but also their co-operation in development and production. Since November 2000, Austria has been a member of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), which promises not only cheaper procurement of armaments by using synergies, but also increased international co-operation for Austrian industries. Access to state-of-the-art international key technologies promises sustained opportunities for Austrian high-tech industries.

#### **4.4.4. Austria as a member of the Partnership for Peace and of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council**

In a basic document signed in February 1995, Austria affirmed its intention to work towards the goals underlying Partnership for Peace (PfP). According to the "Austrian underlying document" of May 1995 NATO and PfP co-operation covers, in particular, co-operation in peace-keeping missions, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and search and rescue operations.

The concrete activities in which Austria wishes to take part are agreed in an Individual Partnership Programme (IPP). Participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) for reaching agreement on concrete inter-operability goals also serves to achieve improved inter-operability between the Austrian Armed Forces on the one hand, and NATO and other PfP member forces on the other. Civilian emergency planning, which Austria contributes to in approximately one third of the activities, is central to Austrian PfP co-operation.

From 1995 to 2001, Austria has participated as PfP partner in the NATO-led multi-national peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR), and in Kosovo (KFOR) since autumn 1999. Since 1997, "Enhanced PfP" has given all partners the opportunity to achieve inter-operability for the entire spectrum of peace-supporting measures, including peace enforcement by combat operations. This step adjusted the spectrum of PfP peace-supporting measures to those of the Petersberg missions. Following a resolution by the Council of Ministers on 24 November 1998, Austria informed the NATO Secretary-General of its capability to co-operate with NATO, NATO members and other PfP partners in all peace-keeping measures. In July 2000, Austria withdrew its previous reservation to some KFOR rules of engagement being applied to the Austrian KFOR contingent (non-participation in coercive peace enforcement measures).



Austria is also actively engaged in the work of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, PfP's political forum of consultation. EAPC is a forum of discussion for many political and security issues, such as discussion of and exchange of information on the implementation of NATO-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

## **5. Basics of Austrian Security Policy**

### **5.1. Fundamental values**

The Republic of Austria is based on solid values, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a commitment to the principles of pluralistic democracy and rule of law. The Republic of Austria advocates tolerance and respect for all humans irrespective of their origin, religion or creed, and protects their dignity. It respects the constitutional rights of national minorities. The Republic of Austria thus protects the freedom and rights of its people and maintains the country's security. It promotes prosperity through economic freedom, social justice, and the country's cultural diversity, building on federalist structures. It assures equal opportunities for all its citizens and supports the sustainable use of natural resources as well as a peaceful and just international order. The Republic of Austria's close adherence to fundamental values is expressed in Austria's comprehensive catalogues of fundamental rights, particularly in the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (ECHR) and the general rights of citizens, both of which are enshrined in the Austrian Constitution.

But Austria is also an integral part of the European Union's community of values, which is based on the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the rule of law. These principles are common to all member states. The European Union and its members are bound to the fundamental rights embedded in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. They include the "traditional" fundamental civil and political rights as well as basic social rights, rights of equality, judicial rights, and those rights enjoyed by individuals by virtue of their EU citizenship. The Charter also provides for protection of the environment, of consumers, children and older people.

On a universal level, the Republic of Austria is, after all, committed to the objectives of the United Nations. These include, in particular, the preservation and protection of world peace and internal security, the conduct of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and the furtherance of international co-operation.

In sustained assurance of these fundamental values, Austria is committed to a comprehensive security and defence policy:

- Austria will preserve its independence from external influence, the inviolability and unity of its territory, protect and defend its constitutional institutions, their freedom of action, and the democratic freedoms of its inhabitants;
- Austria is taking part in the establishment and formulation of a comprehensive and effective European security order that comprises military, psychological, civil, and economic elements;
- Austria, in the spirit of solidarity, participates in the UN, OSCE and NATO, and in international efforts to protect peace and stability;

- Austria is engaged in active relations with its neighbours based on comprehensive co-operation and solidarity;
- Austria is engaged in the further development of European integration as an active and equal partner; in this process, it supports a common European security and defence policy which should lead to joint defence.

## **5.2. International law, the Constitution, and foreign policy in Austria**

The State Treaty of Vienna signed on 15 May 1955, for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria served as an essential basis for an autonomous Austrian security policy. In a political context (Moscow Memorandum dated 15 April 1955), the Federal Constitutional Law on the neutrality of Austria was passed on 26 October 1955 – a day after the last allied soldier left Austrian soil.

The duties of a permanently neutral state are defined by international law. Austria has never interpreted its neutrality as ideological neutralism between the Communist East and the free democratic West, but has always felt committed to the community of pluralist democratic nations.

The following legal provisions are relevant for Austria's security status:

- The Treaty on the European Union, particularly Article 17
- Article 9a of the Constitution on Comprehensive National Defence (military, psychological, civil, and economic) and Article 23f of the Constitution on Austria's participation in CFSP
- The Constitutional Law on co-operation and solidarity in dispatching units and individuals on missions abroad (KSE-BVG) as amended in 1998
- The Federal Law on exports, imports, and transit of war materiel and its amendments of 1982, 1991, and 2001
- The Federal Law on the stay of foreign troops on Austrian territory, and finally, also
- The crime of "threat to neutrality" (section 320 of the Austrian Penal Code) and
- The Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955, on the neutrality of Austria, in which the developments described in Chapter 5.3 with reference to international law and the Constitution have to be taken into account.

[Based on Austria's experience gained at the beginning of the Kosovo crisis in March 1999, major legislative measures are due in 2001. The 2001 amendment to the law on war materiel simplified the procedure for permitting the import, export and transit of war materiel.] The passing of a law on the stationing of troops established a new legal basis for the stay of foreign troops on Austrian territory.

Under the amended law on war material the reasons otherwise leading to a prohibition no longer apply, provided that such import, export or transit is a measure to implement resolutions by the UN Security Council, the EU Council in the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy, or OSCE resolutions. This also applies to peace missions conducted on behalf of an international organisation in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, such as measures to avoid humanitarian disaster or to prevent serious and systematic violations of human rights. The law on the stationing of troops makes clear that foreign troops may be admitted to Austria especially to take part in peace missions.

### **5.3. From Austrian neutrality to solidarity**

When the Austrian Parliament passed the constitutional law on Austria's neutrality on 26 October 1955, it was clear that Austrian neutrality should follow the Swiss model. For good reasons, this had been agreed with the Soviet government in the Moscow Memorandum of April 1955 - Swiss neutrality being the only one in continuous existence since 1814 and whose parameters are determined by international law.

Neutrality was the political price Austria was ready to pay for the re-establishment of its full sovereignty in 1955. Austria's neutrality policy was soon to differ from Switzerland's. When Austria joined the United Nations as early as December 1955, the signatories to the State Treaty of Vienna - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union - obviously saw no reason to object. Austria subsequently developed the concept of "active neutrality policy", which essentially meant that the country endeavoured to assume a useful role for the community of states as a bridge between East and West.

Since 1955, also the security aspects of Austrian foreign policy have repeatedly changed. During the East-West conflict, Austria pursued an "active neutrality policy" including its active role in international organisations, initiatives to reduce international tensions, its active commitment to the observation of international law, and its desire to serve as a venue for international encounter and as seat of international organisations. Austria's "active neutrality policy" was at that time recognised as a useful factor in international relations and as an expression of international solidarity. Between the late sixties and the early eighties, Austrian foreign policy was essentially synonymous with "active neutrality policy".

Especially the past ten to fifteen years increasingly proved that neutrality was a stumbling block to Austria's comprehensive participation in European integration, which the population of Austria had always aspired to.

The fall of the Communist regime in 1989, the emergence of democratic states among Austria's eastern neighbours, and the strategic withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe, fundamentally changed foreign and security policy also in Austria. Austria's perception of neutrality also changed as a result.

In its relationship with the United Nations, Austria believed until 1990 that the world organisation was under an obligation to respect Austria's permanent neutrality and would never oblige the country to apply coercive measures in a military conflict

among third states. During the second Gulf War (1991), Austria's interpretation of the law of neutrality gradually gave priority to the obligation to implement Security Council resolutions under Article 25 of the UN Charter rather than to its obligations under the neutrality act.

As a result, Austria gave permissions of overflight and transit to coalition forces during the second Gulf War on the basis of Security Council resolutions. Then the Austrian law on the import, export and transit of war material was amended correspondingly. Section 320 of the Austrian Penal Code ("Threat to neutrality") was also amended to exempt those cases where the Security Council notes a threat to or breach of peace or an aggressive act and resolves military measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the maintenance or re-establishment of world peace and international security.

Concerning the country's participation in the European integration process, it was initially held that membership of the European Economic Community and later of the European Community was incompatible with Austrian neutrality. From the mid-eighties, and particularly after the fundamental political changes in Europe from 1989 onwards, however, it was eventually accepted that Austria's accession to the European Communities (EC) would not affect the "essence of neutrality".

In July 1989, a few months prior to the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Austria applied for membership in the European Communities.

Joint and equal participation in the European Communities, an epoch-making peace project aimed at continuous deepening and expansion of European integration, seemed to be more important than clinging to a neutrality policy rather devoid of any function in the European context.

Subsequently, Austrian foreign policy increasingly focused on European Political Cooperation (EPC) as practised by the EC (states), and later on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Following its entry into the European Union on 1 January 1995, Austria has become fully integrated into CFSP.

When joining the European Union, Austria did not make any reservation concerning its neutrality. Accession implied incorporation of the entire Community rules (*acquis communautaire*), at that time already comprising the Maastricht Treaty and its provisions on CFSP.

Art. J.4 of the EU Treaty (now Art. 17) allowed for the perspective of a Common Defence Policy, which in due course ought to lead to a joint defence. When Austrians voted for EU accession in the June 1994 referendum, two thirds of the electorate also agreed to these provisions. An Article 23f was added to the Austrian Constitution to avoid incompatibility of Austria's participation in CFSP with the law on neutrality. The crime of threat to neutrality (section 320 of the Penal Code) was again amended accordingly.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which Austria contributed to following its EU membership, stipulates among its goals the gradual definition of a common defence policy. The Treaty also reinforced institutional relations between EU and WEU and incorporated

within CFSP the Petersberg missions for crisis management (including peace-making as well as peace-keeping missions).

When ratifying the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998, Austrian Parliament adopted another constitutional amendment enabling Austria's participation in the entire spectrum of the Petersberg missions irrespective of the law on neutrality. The proponents of that amendment to the Constitution noted that with immediate effect, Austria's participation in such peace-making missions would be possible upon an EU resolution (in other words, without a Security Council mandate).

Also during the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice, Austria supported further strengthening of CFSP: Discussions in Nice focused on progress in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU Treaty, especially by efficient decision-making procedures in connection with political control and strategic leadership in a crisis situation.

When the political and ideological division of Europe was overcome in 1989, numerous European states proceeded to re-formulate, and many of them re-define, their security policies. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO in spring 1999; nine more candidates from Central and Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and the Baltic states are awaiting another accession round. Currently, Finland and Sweden intend to adhere to their non-allied status (with respect to foreign policy practice and not as a legal status) but leave security options open for the future. Ireland and Switzerland want to remain neutral because of their specific situations.

Nevertheless, key decision-makers in EU and NATO, as well as many other competent observers and politicians repeatedly question the role of permanent neutrality in today's solidarity-based European community. As permanent neutrality has lost its importance for Austria in the EU context, this question cannot be answered in the affirmative.

Austria's permanent neutrality has been defined in the respective constitutional law as a means to reach priority goals, aimed at maintaining Austria's political independence and territorial inviolability. In the world of today, Austrian independence is only feasible in the context of multiple mutual relations and interactions which integrate states within a system of mutual dependencies. The opportunities inherent in such inter-linkage can only be seized by joint co-operation and integration of states. Austria has made the decision to participate out of a deep interest of its own. Inviolability of Austria's territory and protection of its heritage and citizens is best effected today by comprehensive Austrian integration into the joint community of European states based on equality. This includes also participation in the Euro-Atlantic security alliance.

It has long stood without doubt that Austria is free to take an autonomous decision on its security status. Austria's joining the United Nations marked the beginning of a modification of the perception of neutrality. The concept again changed fundamentally when Austria joined the European Union. Like Finland and Sweden, Austria is a non-allied country. Any amendment of the Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria is a modification of the Austrian Constitution. Whether Austria

wishes to maintain its non-allied status or to join a defence alliance thus remains to be decided in the future.

## **5.4. Austrian security interests**

Austria's security policy is based on vital national, and EU security interests. These two core elements are key to Austria's major political and strategic goals. The general objectives of the Republic of Austria are translated into concrete action by the country's authorities. National interests thus form the basis of a security strategy and the required instruments and means.

### **5.4.1. Vital Austrian security interests**

Austria's vital security interests include:

- Guaranteeing the Republic of Austria's territorial integrity, self-determination, and freedom of action
- Protecting the constitutional order based on the rule of law and democracy
- Providing internal security and protecting national borders
- Comprehensive protection of the Austrian population and the rule of law
- Protecting the economic and social bases of the state and preserving a healthy environment
- Upholding a stable political, economic and military environment and furthering European stability
- Upholding Austrian interests in the EU and promoting EU interests in a global framework
- Protecting and enhancing fundamental values

Safeguarding and protecting the country's vital security interests is the ultimate goal and supreme political and strategic guideline in Austrian security policy.

### **5.4.2. EU security interests**

The security interests of the European Union as stipulated in Article 11, paragraph 1 of the EU Treaty comprise the following goals:

- Safeguarding common values, basic interests, independence and integrity of the European Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

- Strengthening the security of the European Union in all its forms;
- Preserving peace and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, the principles of the final acts of Helsinki, and the goals set out in the Charter of Paris, including those referring to external borders;
- Furthering international co-operation;
- Developing and strengthening democracy and the rule of law as well as the respect for human rights and basic freedoms.

Mutual dependency exists among member states' national and overall EU interests, expressed in the inability of member states to assert security interests and goals on their own, relying on the solidarity of their European partners, and in the European Union's dependence on solidarity and member states' contributions in developing and enforcing its interests.

#### **5.4.3. Austria's key political and strategic goals**

Based on fundamental values and vital national interests, and with due regard to EU security interests, Austria deduces the following key political and strategic goals in formulating its security policy:

- Strengthening democracy, human rights, the rule of law, as well as the efficiency of economies, particularly when it comes to actively supporting relevant EU, OSCE, or UN projects
- Preventing the emergence of risks and threats to the European Continent as well as assuming increased responsibility for peace and security in the global context
- Comprehensive promotion of stability and security as well as preventing the emergence and escalation of conflicts due to democratic deficits, economic, ethnic, or religious tensions in the strategically relevant area around Austria and the European Union
- Building effective civilian and military capabilities and structures to meet national security requirements and as a prerequisite for a credible and efficient EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
- Maintaining and reinforcing trans-Atlantic partnership as a basis for stability and security in Europe
- Strengthening and deepening regional and global disarmament and arms control, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Balancing the unequal distribution of wealth especially with a view to EU Eastern enlargement and selected countries in connection with development co-operation
- Providing vital resources and essential communications links



- Fighting cross-border crime, terrorism, and manipulation of technological means and information
- Building and further developing provisions and international organisations, and establishing the respective regimes (Rio process etc.), capable of preventing negative developments and implementing positive security goals
- Preserving a healthy environment within the concept of comprehensive environmental protection, by minimising the impact of technological, ecological, or natural disasters.

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